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A FOREWORD TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE
RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
Robert C. Denicola and Harvey S. Perlman*
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (Restatement), was
published early in 1995, concluding a process begun ten years earlier with a
request from the American Law Institute (ALI) for a project proposal
addressing the law governing unfair trade practices. 2 The Restatement of
Torts, promulgated by the ALI in 1938, included a comprehensive treatment
of the law of unfair competition. Plans made in the 1950s for a Restatement
(Second) of Torts envisioned the continued inclusion of unfair competition, and
a tentative draft was prepared in 1963. 3 Eventually, the Council of the
Institute concluded that the subject had become too specialized, too far
removed from general principles of tort law, and too heavily governed by
legislation to warrant its inclusion in the Restatement (Second). 4 When the
ALI embarked on a third series of Restatements in the 1980s, an independent
project on unfair competition was conceived.
"Restating" the law of unfair competition poses special challenges. The
Restatements have traditionally sought to restate the common law, but in unfair
competition, federal and state statutes play a significant, sometimes dominant
role. In some instances the statutes preempt the common law; in other
instances they do not. The statutes frequently rely without significant
elaboration on concepts developed through common law adjudication. Much
of the law of unfair competition is thus shaped by a complex interplay of
statutory provisions and common law rules. The Restatement offers principles
* Robert C. Denicola is the Margaret Larson Professor of Intellectual Property and Harvey
S. Perlman is the Dean at the University of Nebraska College of Law. The authors were the
Reporters for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1993) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
2. During the subsequent decade, the Reporters' drafts were critically reviewed by a panel
of appointed Advisers at a series of seven meetings. The drafts were also reviewed six times by
a Consultative Group composed of interested members of the Institute, four times by the Council
of the Institute, and four times by the membership of the Institute at its annual meetings. Every
meeting yielded significant improvements in the drafts, whether we wanted them or not. The
final product is the Institute's and not our own. The process of creating a Restatement is
described in The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, RefreshinglnstitutionalMemories: Wisconsin
and the American Law Institute: The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1 (1995).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963).
4. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introduction at vii (1977); id., Introductory
Note to Division Nine, at 1-2.
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applicable both to actions at common law and to the interpretation of
analogous statutory codifications. Operating in an area often perceived as a
specialty, we tried to set issues in their broad context, ostensibly for the
benefit of the non-specialist, but also to remind ourselves of the basic policies
and interests that animate these areas of the law. In interpreting the nature of
our charge as Reporters, we were guided by the advice of Herbert Wechsler,
a former Director of the Institute, "to weigh all of the considerations relevant
to development of the common law that our polity calls on the courts to weigh
in their deliberations."' When we proceeded beyond the recitation of
precedent, we sought to rely on analysis and advocacy rather than fiat.6
Much of the Restatement's so-called "black letter" takes the form of
broad standards and catalogs of relevant factors rather than crisp rules and
bright line tests. Although not new to the Restatements,7 we think this
approach is particularly appropriate in a field such as unfair competition where
context is so often everything. We are also mindful of the admonition that
even a non-binding synthesis can inhibit further development.' The analysis
in the Restatement is offered not as a replacement for case law and statutes,
but as a point of departure to the richness of the common law and legislation
that comprise the law of unfair competition.
The Restatement is now being cited by the courts.9 (We recognize that
citations are one thing and influence quite another.) The Restatement has also
stimulated academic debate, including the impressive collection of contribu-
tions in this Symposium. We count that as a major achievement of the
Restatement. We take comfort in noting that some of the contributors complain
5. 43 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 43RD ANNUAL MEETING THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, 27 (1966).
6. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Restatementand Confidentiality,46 OKLA. L. REV. 73 (1993),
(commenting on the style of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers).
7. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to Standards, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 634 (1982); Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract
Method, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 785 (1982) (both commenting on the form adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts). The rule-oriented approach of the earlier Restatement of
Contracts was criticized in Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE
L.J. 643 (1933). Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (attributing abstract Restatement rules to an Institute
bias in favor of the status quo and reaching the unremarkable conclusion that Restatement rules
are typically more vague than rules proposed for legislative enactmentby the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
8. See James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 140 (1981); Harold C. Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
27 ILL. L. RV. 910 (1933).
9. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
[Vol. 47
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that we strayed too far from existing precedent and others that we clung too
tightly to old ways.
The editors have graciously given us this opportunity to comment on the
articles that follow. (What the other contributors think about this, we couldn't
say and probably don't want to know.) We'll be brief. We've already had our
chance in the Restatement.
Miles Alexander and Michael Heilbronner of Kilpatrick & Cody focus on
the doctrine of dilution, arguing for more protection than the black letter rule
in section 25 supplies. They would extend the dilution rationale to limit
trademark use in parodies, comparative advertising, and in the merchandizing
applications that are instead strongly defended in the concluding contribution
by Professor Paul Heald; they would also extend the right of publicity to trade-
marks, arguing that the "persona" of a brand name is entitled to no less
protection than a personal identity. In our view, protection of this magnitude
would provide trademark owners with a sphere of immunity from criticism,
comment, and parody that is unwarranted in a society committed to free
speech and free enterprise."
Section 25 limits relief under the dilution doctrine to unauthorized uses
that "associate" the trademark with the goods or services of another.
Alexander and Heilbronner profess uncertainty as to the meaning of that
limitation. They argue that the comments to section 25 somehow cannot mean
what they seem to say. We compliment their ingenuity in devising interpreta-
tions of the "association" requirement that would provide the magnitude of
protection for "brand equity" that they deem appropriate. However, as the
comments repeatedly indicate, section 25 is significantly more restrictive than
they would like to believe. As stated in comment a, the dilution doctrine
applies "only when the actor uses the other's mark as a means of identification
for the actor's own goods, services, or business. " " Again, in comment c,
10. We are unaware of any empirical evidence supporting claims of actual damage to
trademark owners from parodies or similar uses. There is nothing to indicate, for example, that
the value of trademarks is higher in those states that have dilution statutes than in those that do
not. We have our doubts that Mutual of Omaha actually lost any good will because of the
"Mutant of Omaha" anti-nuclear T-shirts, or that Michelob loyalists fled to Miller Lite because
of the parody advertisement for "Michelob Oily". See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci
Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995); Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988). We are
likewise skeptical that consumers of lawn tractors will cease doing business with John Deere
merely because of a competitor's humorous rendition of the John Deere logo in a comparative
advertisement for Yardmaster. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir.
1994). If, however, consumers are sufficiently amused to give Yardmaster a test drive, the
outcome is completely unobjectionablein a competitive marketplace. We believe that a sense of
humor is a more appropriate remedy than an injunction in many of the situations cited in support
of increased trademark protection.
11. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 25 cmt. a.
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"[t]he rule stated in this [s]ection distinguishes between those cases in which
the actor uses another's designation to identify the actor's own goods or
services and those cases in which the actor uses the other's designation in
some other manner."12 Thus, liability for dilution under section 25 is limited
to cases in which a defendant uses the mark like a trademark to identify its
own goods or services.' 3 This straightforward interpretation of the "associa-
tion" requirement is confirmed by the use of the same requirement in the
definition of use as a trademark in section 18. Alexander and Heilbronner wish
the rule had a broader, more malleable meaning. The argument was raised in
one form or another at every level of the drafting process. The International
Trademark Association argued for broader protection to the end. 4 For the
reasons described in the comments to section 25, we think a narrow rule is
best.
Alexander and Heilbronner apparently believe that section 25 fails to
cover the full universe of possible cases. They maintain that the black letter
does not provide for "hybrid" cases in which the mark is used both as a
trademark for the defendant's own goods and also to ridicule or otherwise
comment on the trademark owner or its products. We do not understand their
uncertainty. The structure of section 25 is straightforward: if a defendant uses
the mark like a trademark to identify its own goods or services, protection
against dilution is available under subsection (1), whether or not the use is also
a parody or commentary on the trademark owner. If the defendant does not
use the mark to identify its own goods or services, the alternative rule in
subsection (2) applies. We cannot find any omitted case.
Alexander and Heilbronner also express concern that subsection (2)
creates an irrebuttable presumption that parodies and other expressive uses of
trademarks are protected by the First Amendment. It does not. Instead, the
Restatement takes the position that liability for such nontrademark uses should
be determined, not under the dilution rationale, but under other causes of
action that include doctrinal accommodations designed to weigh the speech
interests at issue. We are also troubled by their casual equating of commercial
motivation and the reduced constitutional protection afforded to "commercial
speech." We would point out that speech designed to make a profit is not
synonymous with "commercial speech"-a proposition we feel certain would
12. Id. § 25 cmt. c; see also id. § 25 cmts. f, g, i.
13. We do not mean to imply that the defendant's use must satisfy all of the technical
requirements necessary for protection as a trademark. For that reason, we have tried to avoid
the term "trademark use" to describe the nature of the required conduct. It is sufficient if the
defendant uses the mark in a manner likely to be understood as a symbol that identifies the
defendant or its products.
14. See Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark
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be seconded by the New York Times, CBS, or Random House. We do,
however, admit to our refusal to accede to their proposition that trademark
rights should be "on par" with the First Amendment.
Professor Edmund Kitch explores some implications of the Restatement
sections on trade secrets. The Restatement follows the lead of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act in expanding the scope of information eligible for protection
as a trade secret.'" Professor Kitch speculates on the consequences of this
expansion, particularly for former employees. He wonders also about its
impact on the rights of the press.
Questions relating to the disclosure of trade secrets by the press (and more
generally, to all non-commercial disclosures) are not necessarily new, but
Professor Kitch is probably right in anticipating that the expanded subject
matter of trade secret law will force a more systematic exploration of the
issue. We have tried to call attention to the problem, 6 but in light of the
importance of context and the absence of any real law to "restate," we offer
only a general caution that in this area of trade secret law, the usual formula-
tions may have to give way.
As Professor Kitch explains, the widening reach of trade secret protection
may further complicate the already complex balance of interests between
employers and their former employees.' 7 He emphasizes that the appropriate
accommodation may best be reached by contractual bargaining. Courts must
remain sensitive to the legitimate interests of both employers and their former
employees in defining protectable subject matter" and in enforcing contractu-
al restraints on competition.' 9 We hope that the remedial provisions of the
Restatement are sufficiently flexible to encourage courts to weigh both the
nature of the trade secret and the risk and consequences of its appropriation
in selecting appropriate relief, particularly with respect to injunctions.'
Professor Gary Myers discusses the issue of misappropriation. Section 38
of the Restatement urges an end to the sporadic attempts at common law to
create a generalized remedy against appropriations of intangible trade values.
Recognition of broad and indeterminate rights against misappropriation
threatens the public interest in competition and intrudes on the public domain.
We believe that an independent misappropriation doctrine is obsolete,
especially in light of the development of more specialized rules governing
intangible assets.
15. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 39 cmt. d.
16. See id. § 40 cmt. c & reporters' note to cmt. c.
17. The issue is one of degree, since prior law already protected confidential business
information that fell beyond the old edges of trade secret law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1957); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 (1939).
18. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 42 cmt. d.
19. See id. § 42 cmt. g.
20. See id. § 44 cmt. c.
1996]
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Professor Myers makes the case for abandoning the misappropriation tort.
We admire his optimism in thinking that the Restatement may actually lead to
the doctrine's demise. We hope he is right. However, a doctrine that has
survived attack by Louis Brandies21, Learned Hand 2, and (at least by
implication) the Supreme Court' 3 may not succumb so easily, even to the
American Law Institute.
The right of publicity in all its manifestations provides the subject for
Professor Oliver Goodenough. He offers an interesting historical perspective
on the entangled development of privacy and publicity rights.
Professor Goodenough wishes that the Restatement's treatment of the right
of publicity had started with a cleaner slate, particularly with respect to the
continued use of the phrase "for purposes of trade" and the decision not to
present an integrated treatment of both privacy and publicity rights. On the
latter, we went as far toward integration as we believed appropriate in light of
the limits of our jurisdictional mandate over unfair competition.24 However,
even if we had felt less constrained, we would not have departed significantly
from the current distinction between privacy and publicity. We see substantial
differences between the personal interests associated with privacy and the
commercial interests associated with publicity. It is one thing to remedy injury
caused by the dissemination of false or personal information, and another to
authorize the exclusive exploitation of publicly available information and
images.21
As for "purposes of trade," given a clean slate, we too might have
selected a different linguistic formulation to symbolize the boundaries of the
publicity right. However, that phrase (or a variation such as "commercial"
purpose) appears regularly in the statutes on publicity rights,26 and we believe
that its use in the Restatement helps to orient the discussion within existing
21. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. In a series of opinions for the Second Circuit, Hand simply refused to recognize the
Supreme Court's adoption of the misappropriation doctrine in International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d
279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (limiting International News Service v. Associated Press to its facts),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.)
(finding that the Supreme Court's misappropriation doctrine cannot be used "to prevent
competitors from ever appropriating the results of the industry, skill and expense of others"),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
23. See Sears, Roebuck& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
24. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 46 cmt. b.
25. Compare, for example, the rules protecting confidential information like trade secrets
(Restatement § 40) with the reluctance to recognize a general tort of misappropriation (see
Restatement § 38).
26. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 47 reporters' note to cmt. a.
[Vol. 47
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statutory and case law. We also believe that it serves to underscore the limits
imposed by the distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence between speech
that proposes a commercial transaction and "non-commercial" speech, even
if inspired by the prospect of profit. In any event, we hope that the engine will
be the content and not the label. 27
Professor Goodenough proves the strength of his convictions by offering
a restatement of his own. As an initial matter, we are inherently suspicious of
any attempt to answer difficult policy questions by arguing about whether an
interest qualifies as "property."28 In addition, his attempt to utilize the
publicity tort as a vehicle for redressing false statements about public or
private figures can only lead to mischief.29 We doubt, for example, that the
imposition of liability under the circumstances described in subsection (2) of
his proposal would withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. We also
wonder about the utility of warning judges and lawyers that in some contexts
relief should be granted "grudgingly," while in others the right should "extend
broadly," and that additional categories of wrongful use "shall not be added
lightly." Some aspects of his restatement sound like the ALI's; other aspects
clearly differ. In the end, we like ours better, but readers can judge for
themselves.
Professor Paul Heald takes up a pair of issues-the use of trademarks on
so-called "promotional goods" and the limits of a celebrity's right to control
the use of his or her persona in commercial advertising. The first issue
concerns the use of famous marks to increase the attractiveness or desirability
of merchandise such as T-shirts or coffee mugs. (Although Professor Heald is
fond of examples involving the University of Georgia Bulldogs and the Atlanta
Braves, we believe that merchandise bearing the word "Huskers" presents a
more compelling illustration.)
The Restatement does not recognize a general right on the part of
trademark owners to control every commercial exploitation of their marks.
Instead, the scope of trademark rights is generally limited by the requirement
that the owner prove a likelihood of confusion.30 Professor Heald believes
that in the context of promotional goods, the traditional rules, especially the
possibility of infringement based on post-sale confusion, may cut too deeply
into the public's ability to utilize famous trademarks as vehicles for personal
expression. In contrast to Alexander and Heilbronner, he applauds the
Restatement's decision to exclude from liability under the dilution doctrine
27. The meaning of the term is the subject of Restatement § 47.
28. We would also remind Professor Goodenough that even when a right indubitably sounds
in property, its invasion is a tort, and hence under any account the cause of action described in
the Restatement is properly labeled as tort.
29. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 47 cmt. c & reporters' note to cmt. c.
30. See id. § 20 cmts. b & e.
1996]
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trademark uses that do not indicate the source of the goods on which they are
used."'
In its brief consideration of post-sale confusion, the Restatement notes that
not all such confusion is actionable as infringement-the confusion must
significantly threaten the trademark owner's interest in avoiding a diversion of
sales through deception or harm to its reputation or good will." Professor
Heald's analysis of the market for promotional goods may offer a valuable
model for implementing that criteria. However, we believe that his appeal to
the doctrine of functionality is misplaced. The copying of a trademark for its
ornamental or expressive value can certainly be described as "functional"
copying. The use of that label, however, does not bring the issue within the
scope of trademark law's functionality doctrine. As described in section 17 of
the Restatement, the latter concept is intended to bar the recognition of
trademark rights in product and packaging features that are important to
effective competition by others. If a design is "functional," it is ineligible for
protection (or registration) as a trademark. 33 Hallmark cannot claim trade-
mark rights in Christmas cards bearing the figure of Santa Claus, even if it
invented the genre. The doctrine of functionality thus defines the permissible
subject matter of trademark protection. In the promotional goods cases,
however, there is no dispute that the copied symbol is a valid trademark. The
issue is instead whether a particular use of a trademark falls within the scope
of the rights granted to the owner of a mark. On that issue, the functionality
doctrine in section 17 is irrelevant.34
Professor Heald's concern with public access to symbols of communica-
tion extends to the scope of protection afforded to celebrities by the right of
publicity. Under section 47 of the Restatement, the unauthorized use of a
celebrity's name or likeness in an advertisement for goods or services is
ordinarily actionable. 3 Drawing on analogies to trademark law, Professor
Heald argues for a distinction between actionable advertising uses that exploit
a connection between the personal qualities of a celebrity and the acquisitional
preferences of consumers, and permissible advertising uses that instead exploit
the "generic" attributes of a celebrity's identity in order to communicate with
prospective consumers. In our view, analogies to trademark law ignore the
special interest in personal autonomy that is associated with the right of
publicity. We are also skeptical about whether the proposed distinction would
prove workable in practice, and we disagree that it is supported by existing
case law.
31. See id. § 25 cmt. i.
32. Id. § 20 cmt. b.
33. Id. § 16 cmt. d.
34. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 17 cmt. b & reporters' note to cmt. b.
35. Id. § 47 emt. a.
[Vol. 47
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Individually, the articles in this Symposium offer provocative analysis.
Collectively, they illustrate the clash of interests and values that makes the
formulation of unfair competition law challenging not only for restaters but for
the courts. Alexander and Heilbronner urge greater protection of trade symbols
in order to protect an owner's investment from those who might appropriate
it; Goodenough would offer greater protection to the personal interests
associated with a person's identity. Myers and Heald, on the other hand, both
argue for a broader privilege to exploit what others have created in order to
preserve and promote free expression and free enterprise; Kitch illustrates how
these competing views emerge in conflicts between employers and employees
over shared information. The law has sought to balance these conflicting
perspectives in pursuit of the public interest. We have tried to reflect that
balance in the Restatement.
9
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